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Lamons: Constitutional Law - Tenth Amendment - Challenges of Commerce Cla
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TENTH AMENDMENT-Challenges of Commerce
Clause Legislation Affecting Private Individuals and Businesses. Hodel
, 101
U.S ........
v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n .......
S. Ct. 2352 (1981).

The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
19771 established a nationwide program for surface mining
and reclamation. The Act was written in response to the
growing need for energy development in America.2 The basic
purposes of the Act were to minimize the environmental
impact of surface coal mining, to preclude surface mining
in areas where surface mining could potentially cause irreparable damage, and to balance the need for energy development in America against the need to protect the environment, and other industry, especially agriculture.' The Act
created the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and
Enforcement (OSM) within the Department of the Interior 4
and gave primary responsibility for administering the Act
to the Secretary of the Interior.5 The Act established minimum standards of mining control and reclamation' which
are enforced by licensing requirements,' bonding of operators,8 and by various civil and criminal sanctions.'
OSM was directed to promulgate interim' ° and permanent" regulations. When permanent programs under the
SMCRA took effect, the federal standards were to supersede state surface mining regulations. 2 The Act permitted
a state to continue to regulate surface mining and reclamation within the state, if it enacted state laws implementing
the minimum standards established by the Act, and if the
state could show it had the administrative and technical
ability to enforce these state laws.'" The Secretary of the
Copyright© 1982 by the University of Wyoming

1. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1308 (Supp. III 1979) [hereinafter cited in text as the
SMCRA or the Act].
2. See a discussion of the legislative history of the Act in Binder, Strip
Mining, the West and the Nation, 12 LAND & WATER L. REY. 1 (1977).
3. See 30 U.S.C. § 1202(a), (c), (f) (Supp. III 1979); Binder, supra note
2, at 1-25.
4. 30 U.S.C. § 1211 (Supp. III 1979).
5. Id. § 1211(c).
6. Id. 1§ 1251-1279.

7. Id. §1252(a), 1256, 1260(d) (1).
8. Id. §§ 1259, 1269.

9. Id. § 1268 (a), (e), § 1270.
10. Id.§ 1251 (a). See 30 C.F.R. § 710 (1981).

11. 30 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (Supp. III 1979). See 30 C.F.R. § 701 (1981).

12. 30 U.S.C. § 1254(g) (Supp. III 1979).
13. Id. § 1253.
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Interior was given the authority to create and enforce a
permanent state program for any state which failed to
implement or to enforce a satisfactory state program.14
Among the minimum standards defined in Title V of
the Act are special provisions relating to "steep slope"
mining1" and provisions relating to "prime farmlands". "
The "steep slope" provisions require, among other things,
that any "steep slope" minesite must be returned to its
"approximate original contour" after mining.17 The "prime
farmland" provisions require, among other things, that the
land be returned to at least the productive ability of similar
farmlands in the surrounding area.18 In order to obtain a
license to conduct mining on these sites, mine operators
were required to make a preliminary showing that they
possessed the capacity to comply with the Act. 9 In addition,
mine operators who failed to meet the standards in reclamation of such sites forfeited their bond.20
The Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association was an association of coal producers subject to the
provisions of the Act. These coal producers believed the provisions of the Act practically precluded them from mining
the coal deposits in southwestern Virginia. " Since coal
mining was the predominant industry in that region, the
Association believed the SMCRA would destroy the "economic life blood of the communities and the people of the
region", " and would adversely affect the taxing powers of
local governments in the area.-" Therefore, the Association,
along with several coal mine operators and coal land owners,
filed suit in the Federal District Court of the Western District of Virginia, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. §§ 1254, 1256(a).
Id. § 1265(d).
Id. § 1260(d).
Id. § 1265 (d) (4). Steep slope means "any slope above twenty degrees." Id.
Id. § 1260 (d). Under § 1291(20), "prime farmland" has the same meaning
as that "previously prescribed by the Secretary of Agriculture." See 7
C.F.R. § 657 (1980).
30 U.S.C. § 1260(b) (2), (d) (1) (Supp. III 1979).
Id. § 1269.
Brief of Petitioners at 6, Hadel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclama101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981).
tion Ass'n ........ U.S.
Id. at 2.
ld. at 30.
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from several provisions of the Act.24 The Commonwealth of
Virginia and the Town of Wise, Virginia intervened as
plaintiffs challenging the Act under various Constitutional
provisions.
The District Court upheld the Act as a legitimate
exercise of congressional Commerce Clause powers,25 but
held the challenged provisions to be an unconstitutional violation of the Tenth Amendment.2" The Supreme Court noted
probable jurisdiction of a direct appeal from this decision, 7
and heard the case in June of 1981.
In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation
Ass'n,2" the plaintiffs, (hereinafter referred to as Virginia),
alleged that Congress exceeded the Commerce Clause power
in enacting the SMCRA. Virginia argued that the effect of
the Act was to regulate land use, which is an area of regulation traditionally left to the states. 9 The Court, in response, noted that Congress had concluded that surface
mining and reclamation "affect" commerce." The Court
said that since this conclusion was based on detailed investigations and hearings, the Court could not say that the
Congress' conclusion was irrational. 3 The Court therefore
held the Act was a legitimate
exercise of congressional
32
Commerce Clause power.
Virginia also argued that the SMCRA violated the
Tenth Amendment.3 It argued that land use regulation was
a traditional state function, and that the SMCRA substantially impaired the states' ability to perform that function.'
24. Virginia challenged the Act on Commerce Clause, Fifth, and Tenth amendment grounds. Only Commerce Clause and Tenth amendment challenges are
discussed in this case note.
25. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc. v. Andrus, 483 F.
Supp. 425, 431 (W.D. Va. 1980).
26. Id. at 435.
27. The Supreme Court may accept a direct appeal from a federal district
court decision which holds an Act of Congress to be unconstitutional pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976).
28. U.-5 ...... 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981) [hereinafter cited in text as Hodel].
29. Id. at 2359.
30. Id. at 2360-61.
31. Id. at 2362.
32. Id. at 2364.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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Citing National League of Cities v. Usery,35 the state
reasoned the federal interest in enforcing the SMCRA in
Virginia was slight as compared to the substantial imposition the Act caused on state sovereignty. 6 Virginia also
argued that the SMCRA coerced the state legislatures into
enacting specific mining and reclamation regulations in
order to avoid losing its power to regulate surface mining
and reclamation to a federal agency.3
The Supreme Court clarified Usery, and held the
SMCRA did not violate the Tenth Amendment since it
regulated private individuals and businesses, and did not
regulate "states as states"."8 The Court held that this was
simply a matter of legitimate federal regulations preempting contradictory state regulations under the Supremacy
Clause. 9
COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS

The power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce
under the Commerce Clause is plenary." Though much has
been said about the expansion of the Commerce Clause
power in recent years, in reality the plenary powers have
not been expanded as such. It is the powers under the
Necessary and Proper Clause which have been expanded. 4'
The Necessary and Proper Clause enables Congress to enact
legislation when it is "necessary" and "proper" to do so in
effectively fulfilling a specifically enumerated purpose, such
as the regulation of commerce.
The powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause
are not "plenary" or "full, entire, complete, absolute, perfect
35. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) [hereinafter cited in text as Usery]. In Usery the
Court invalidated federal minimum wage standards as applied to state
employees performing traditional governmental functions. Id.
36. See Brief of Petitioners, supra note 21, at 35.
37. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, eupra note 28,
at 2366-67.
38. Id. at 2366.
39. Id. at 2367-68.
40. See generally Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824).
41. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See generally

Engdahl, The Federal Lands Program Under the Surface Mining Control

and Reclamation Act of 1977, 26 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 117, 134

(1980).
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[and] unqualified." 4 The standard of analysis used by the
Court in reviewing Necessary and Proper Clause questions
5 The power is
was established in McCulloch v. Maryland."
subject to three limitations: 1) The ends sought must be
legitimate;44 2) the means chosen by Congress must be
appropriate;4 3) the means chosen by Congress must not
violate a clear proscription of another constitutional provision, such as the First Amendment or the Tenth Amendment. 6
The modern Court, when asked to invalidate an Act of
Congress because it exceeds the Necessary and Proper and
Commerce Clause powers, exercises a great deal of deference
towards congressional determinations. The Court refuses
to second guess Congress' determination that the regulated
activity "substantially affects" commerce." The Court will
refuse to inquire into a statute's "real" purposes, or the
drafters' "true" motives, so long as the regulation might
rationally promote legitimate ends which Congress might
have been pursuing. 8 Thus, the power of Congress to regulate even intrastate activity under the Necessary and Proper
and Commerce Clauses has become so broad that some authors have concluded that the only limitations on the powers
are express constitutional proscriptions, such as the Bill of
Rights. 9 The Court's analysis in Hodel exemplifies the great
deference given by the Court in modern Commerce Clause
litigation.
Virginia alleged that the purpose of the Act was to regulate land use, not commerce, and was therefore beyond the
Commerce Clause jurisdiction of Congress.5" The Court responded that its role, in determining whether a particular
42. Mashunkashey v. Mashunkashey, 191 Okla. 501, 134 P.2d 976, 979 (1942).
43. Supra note 41, at 421.
44. The Court will ask here whether the regulation is rationally related to
one of the specifically enumerated purposes. With Commerce Clause related questions, the Court asks whether the regulated activity "substantially affects" commerce.
45. Here the Court will determine whether the means chosen bear a rational
relationship to accomplishment of the legitimate ends sought.
46. See generally Engdahl, supra note 41, at 131.
47. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964).
48. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941); 8ee also L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 5.4, at 236 (1978).
49. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 48, § 5.4, at 234, § 5.7, at 240.
50. Brief of Petitioners, supra note 21, at 12.
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congressional act is valid under the Commerce Clause, is
relatively narrow." "The Court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate
commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a finding.""
The Court then noted the detailed studies and hearings conducted by Congress prior to the enactment of the SMCRA,
and concluded that in light of the evidence available to Congress, and the detailed consideration the legislation received
''we cannot say that Congress did not have a rational basis
for concluding that surface coal mining has substantial effects on interstate commerce."5 Virginia, in its brief, attempted to refute these congressional findings.54 The Court
chose not to scrutinize the findings and therefore did not
address Virginia's statistical allegations."
The thrust of Virginia's argument was that land, as
such, could not be "in commerce", and since the SMCRA did
not regulate the "commerce aspects" of mining, such as
extraction or transportation, it was really a "land use regulation"." This argument is substantially similar to efforts
made in the past to distinguish different aspects of manufacturing, by arguing that Congress could not regulate the
goods until they "entered" commerce. These arguments were
rejected long ago. 7
A companion case to Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n was Hodel v. Indiana." In that case the
state challenged the SMCRA's "prime farmland" provisions
with Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment grounds. The
Appellants in that case argued that Congress could not regulate those facets of surface coal mining under the commerce
power since coal mining on prime farmlands had only an
"infinitesimal effect" or "trivial impact" on interstate com51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, supra note 28,
at 2360.
Id. (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, upra note 47, at 258).
Id. at 2362.
Brief of Petitioners, upra note 21, at 16-25.
See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, supra note
28, at 2362 n.20.
Brief of Petitioners, supra note 21, at 12.
See NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
,101 S. Ct. 2376 (1981).
_ U.S.
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merce " The Supreme Court, in denying their challenge,
emphasized that the actual volume of commerce affected by
the regulated activity is irrelevant." The Court held "the
pertinent inquiry ...is not how much commerce is involved,
but whether Congress could rationally conclude that the regulated activity affects commerce"." The Court refused to
scrutinize Congress' objectives, saying it would not substitute its judgment for congressional determinations.2 This
follows recent decisions, which have held that when Congress
determines a particular class of activity substantially affects
commerce, it can then regulate all members of that class,
regardless of whether an individual member's potential impact on commerce, standing alone, is substantial or not.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist concurred in Hodel v. Indiana,
and Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation
Ass'n 4 In his concurring opinion he stated that although
he agreed with the outcome of the decisions, the Court's
opinion seemed to imply that any activity which merely
affects commerce may be regulated under the Commerce
Clause.6 He noted that the Court's extreme deference might
lead one to believe that there really is no limitation on the
Commerce Clause power.6
The Commerce Clause holding in Hodel is important
because the Court affirmed several circuit court cases which
have upheld recent federal environmental protection enactments against Commerce Clause challenges. 7 This marks
another step in the expansion of the Necessary and Proper
and Commerce powers to regulate intrastate activities which
have the potential of substantially affecting interstate commerce. This trend has given rise to some concern that the
further expansion of this power could potentially destroy
the states' sovereignty. As one author put it "no one expects
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Indiana v. Andrus, 501 F. Supp. 452, 460 (S.D. Ind. 1980).
Hodel v. Indiana, supra note 58, at 2383.
Id.
Id. at 2384.
See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942) ; Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 146,150 (1971).
Supra note 28, at 2389 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Id. at 2391-92.
Id. at 2389-91.
Id. at 2363.
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Congress to obliterate the states, at least in one fell swoop.
If there is any danger, it lies in the tyranny of small decisions-in the prospect that Congress will nibble away at
state sovereignty . . . until someday essentially nothing is
left but a gutted shell." 8
TENTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS

A. Scope of Usery
Until 1937, the Supreme Court interpreted the Tenth
Amendment as imposing substantial restraints on Congress'
power under the Commerce Clause. Several times the Court
struck down congressional acts as exceeding this power."
With the Great Depression and the New Deal, the Court did
a turnabout, overruling these prior cases in NLRB v. Jones
and Laughlin Steel Corp." From 1937 to 1976, the Tenth
Amendment seemed to be dormant. The Supreme Court in
United States v. Darby' referred to the Tenth Amendment
as "a mere truism" which only meant that those powers
not surrendered by the States to the Federal Government
have been retained by the States. But then the Supreme
Court in National League of Cities v. Usery,2 for the first
time in four decades, held that an Act of Congress violated
the Tenth Amendment. The scope of the Tenth Amendment
immunity, established by Usery, was unclear.7" For example,
while two federal district courts read Usery broadly, holding
the SMCRA violated the Tenth Amendment, 4 two other
federal district courts rejected similar Tenth Amendment
challenges to the SMCRA.75 The district court in Virginia
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

L. TRIBE, supra note 48, § 5.20, at 302.
See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
Supra note 57.
Supra note 48, at 124.
Supra note 35.
E.g., compare Note, Tenth Amendment Challenges to the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977: The Implications of National League
of Cities on Indirect Regulation of the States, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 589
(1980), with Note, Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977:
Regulatory Controversies and Constitutional Challenges, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q.

762 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Surface Mining Control].
74. Indiana v. Andrus, supra note 59; Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc. v. Andrus, supra note 25.
75. Star Coal v. Andrus, 14 Env't Rep. Cases (BNA) 1325 (S.D. Iowa 1980);
Concerned Citizens for Appalachia, Inc. v. Andrus, 494 F. Supp. 679 (D.C.
Tenn. 1980).
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Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus interpreted Usery as sweeping away nearly forty years of precedent.76 That court believed that any Federal regulation
which interfered with a state's freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions was invalid under the Usery standards.7 Since the
SMCRA displaced state regulation in the traditional governmental function of land use regulation, the Act was held
to be invalid.
The Supreme Court in Hodel clarified the scope of
Usery. The Court said a successful Tenth Amendment challenge of a congressional act must satisfy each of three requirements."8 First, there must be a showing that the challenged statute regulates "states as states";" second, the
federal regulation must address matters which are "indisputably attributes of state sovereignty" ;80 and third, it must
be apparent that the states' compliance with the federal law
would indirectly impair their ability to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional functions.8 Since the first
requirement had not been met, the Court in Hodel denied
the Tenth Amendment challenges.
Virginia argued that the SMCRA coerced the state
legislatures into enacting specific regulations in order to
avoid the possibility of losing their power to regulate land
use within the state to a federal agency."' Thus, they argued,
the pervasive effect of the SMCRA regulated the "states as
states"83 . The Court did not concern itself with the question
of whether the potential impact of the SMCRA fell upon the
"states as states". The Court said the incidence of the regulations falls upon private individuals and businesses who are
"necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty of the govern76. Supra note 25, at 425, 432.
77. Id.
78. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n,
at 2366.
79. Id. (citing National League of Cities v. Usery, supra note 35,
80. Id. (citing National League of Cities v. Usery, supra note 35,
81. Id. (citing National League of Cities v. Usery, supra note 35,
82. Brief of Petitioners, supra note 21, at 41.
83. Id.
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ment of the Nation and of the state in which they reside.""
The Court went on to say that this was merely an instance
of preemption of state law by legitimate federal legislation."
"It would be ... a radical departure from long established
precedent for this Court to hold that the Tenth Amendment
prohibits Congress from displacing state police power laws
regulating private activity."86
The result in Hodel is not surprising in light of the
narrowly drawn language of the Usery decision. The Court's
opinion in Usery relied to some extent upon New York v.
United States,8" another Supreme Court case which dealt
with the issue of intergovernmental immunities from taxation. Intergovernmental immunities from taxation and from
regulation have had similar histories and have been treated
as corollaries by the Court.88 These two areas, taken together, comprise a broader theory of "intergovernmental
immunities". 9 Thus the scope of the Tenth Amendment
immunities defined in Usery and Hodel can be clarified by
reading the cases in light of the tax immunity defined in
New York v. United States. There, Justice Stone, speaking
for a plurality of the Court, said the immunity only extended
to "State activities and State-owned properties that partake
of uniqueness from the point of view of intergovernmental
relations"."0 The Court said that the federal government
could not tax a state house, or income derived by the states
through taxation."
But then the Court limited the immunity, saying it
only extended to taxation of "states as states".9" In this
context, Usery and Hodel should not be read broadly, as
indicative of a change of direction by the Court. They should
84. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, supra note 28,
at 2365 (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, supra note 35, at
845).
85. Id. at 2367-68.
86. Id. at 2368.
87. National League of Cities v. Usery, upra note 35. at 843 (quoting New
York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 587-89 (1946) (Stone, J., plurality
opinion)).
88. See L. TRIBE, supra note 48, § 5-20, at 304, § 5-22, at 311.
89. See Engdahl, supra note 41, at 146-47.
90. 326 U.S. 572, 588 (1946).
91. Id. at 582.
92. Id.
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rather be read in line with applications of the tax immunity to
intergovernmental immunities from regulation."3
Some authors have been critical of the Court's narrow
interpretation of intergovernmental immunities. One noted
authority has stated that it is improper to extend the immunity only to the government entity, since the Tenth
Amendment reserves non-enumerated powers to the states,
and to the people. 4 He also argued that it is an anomaly to
conclude that a state is more interested in regulating its
own service providing employees than it is in regulating the
activities of private persons and business conducted within
its borders. 5 It can also be argued that the citizens and
businesses in the state have an interest in having their day
to day activities governed by local government which will be
more able to understand their needs, and their peculiar
circumstances.
B. Standard of Analysis
One flaw in the Usery opinion was the Court's failure
to enunciate a standard of analysis to be used by litigants
and lower tribunals in cases deciding Tenth Amendment
questions. Indeed there appeared to be some confusion
among the justices themselves concerning what standard of
analysis had been used. Mr. Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the Court, seemed to use a per se standard, by enumerating
criteria which would, if met, establish a violation of the
Tenth Amendment. Yet the Court failed to overrule Fry
v. United States,," and held that Congress could still enact
regulations which violate those criteria in emergency situations." Mr. Justice Stevens assumed the Court established
a per se standard, and dissented because he could not distinguish the invalidated regulations from other "unquestionably permissible" federal regulations of similar state and
See Engdahl, supra note 41, at 146-47.
L. TRIBF, supra note 48, § 5-22, at 312.
Id.
421 U.S. 542 (1975). In Fry, the Court upheld the Economic Stabilization
Act of 1970. The Court described the Economic Stabilization Act as "an
emergency measure to counter severe inflation that threatened the national
economy," and said that the Act preempted conflicting State law under
the Supremacy Clause. Id. at 548.
97. National League of Cities v. Usery, eupra note 35, at 853.

93.
94.
95.
96.
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local activities. 8 In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice
Blackmun assumed the Court used a balancing analysis,
weighing the state's interest in being immune from federal
regulation against the federal interest in effectively regulating the subject matter." Both Justices Stevens and Blackmun expressed some concern that the per se standard of
analysis implied in the majority opinion, would invalidate
Federal environmental regulations as applied to state and
local governments. 10
Virginia argued in Hodel that under the Blackmun
balancing test, the state interest in being immune from
federal regulation clearly outweighed the federal interest
in enforcing the SMCRA in Virginia.1"' They argued that
the federal interest in preventing environmental impact was
either already met by existing regulations, or was not furthered by the SMCRA provisions as applied to southwestern
Virginia.'0 2 They offered evidence that the steep slope provisions, as applied to this region, actually increased the adverse environmental effects of surface mining.'
The Supreme Court refused to adopt this analysis. 4
The Court once again did not specifically address the
question of what standard is to be used in Tenth Amendment
cases. The three step test seems to establish a per se rule,
but the Court also stated that meeting the three requirements does not guarantee that the challenge will succeed, and
that there are situations in which the federal interest may
outweigh the states' interest in being immune from federal
regulation. 5 The analysis used by the Court in Hodel and
Usery implies that a standard of analysis similar to the
standard used in some equal protection cases should be used.
If the challenger in an equal protection case can show that
98. Id. at 880-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99. id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 880-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ; id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
101. Brief of Petitioners, supra note 21, at 35.
102. Id. at 25, 37-38.
103. Id. at 37-38.
104. The Court said that determining the adequacy of existing regulations or
the wisdom of the Act were questions for Congress to determine and not
for the Court. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n,
eupra note 28, at 2363.
105. See id. at 2366 n.29.
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the challenged regulation classifies people into "suspect classifications", this triggers strict scrutiny, and only compelling state purposes will overcome the strong presumption of
invalidity."' Similarly, the Court in Hodel and Usery
seemed to say that if a challenger can make an initial showing that the congressional act offends the three criteria, this
will heighten judicial scrutiny, and only compelling federal
interests will be able to overcome the presumption of invalidity. This analysis would explain why Fry was not overruled, since the regulation there was identified as an "emergency federal wage control"1 ' which was of sufficient federal importance to overcome even a strong presumption of
invalidity. This standard adequately answers Mr. Justice
Stevens' dissent in Usery. Since a balancing analysis is used
after the three criteria have been met, the Court can then
distinguish between invalid and "unquestionably permissible" regulations.0 8
OTHER LIMITATIONS ON COMMERCE CLAUSE POWERS

As was discussed above, the Court in Hodel held that
the SMCRA was a valid commerce clause regulation which
preempted conflicting state regulations and which did not
violate the Tenth Amendment. The scheme of the SMCRA
is not a new one. Several recent environmental protection
enactments have created similar programs which have been
described as "cooperative federalism" programs.'
These
programs seek to induce local implementations of national
standards for environmental protection by offering funds
to states, as well as by threatening private entities with
penalties for violations of the standards. The Court in Hodel
106. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
107. See Fry v. United States, supra note 96, at 548.
108. To further highlight the consistency between New York v. United States
and the Usery and Hodel decisions, two cases which rejected Tenth Amendment challenges of federal regulatory statutes since the New York decision
in 1946. Both involved what could be classified as emergency federal regulations. See Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946); Hulbert v. Twin Falls
Cty., 327 U.S. 103 (1946) (both challenging the Emergency Price Control
Act enacted to control the wartime economy). Both would be decided the
same way under Hodel's Tenth Amendment analysis.
109. See Edgman & Menzel, The Regulation of Coal Surface Mining in a Federal System, 21 NAT. REsOURCEs J. 245 (1981); Battle, Transportation
Controls Under the Clean Air Act-An Experience in (Un)Cooperative
Federalism, 15 LA.D & WATER L. REv. 1 (1980).
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in upholding the SMCRA, summarily affirmed several circuit court decisions which upheld other "cooperative federalism" programs in the face of Commerce Clause and Tenth
Amendment challenges."'
Hodel involved a preenforcement challenge to the
SMCRA.111 Though state officials have been unsuccessful
in challenging cooperative federalism enactments on Tenth
Amendment or strict Commerce Clause grounds,' 2 they may
still argue that the provisions in these enactments should be
narrowly construed so as to minimize their actual imposition upon state sovereignty. One well known author has
stated that the Supreme Court will narrowly construe commerce clause enactments which serve to reduce state sovereignty, requiring Congress to clearly announce its intent
to preempt state regulation over the subject matter before
the language will be given that effect.113 Thus if the language will bear two constructions, the Court will prefer
the construction which interferes the least with state4 sovereignty. This so called "clear statement doctrine""1 will
supposedly prevent Congress from resorting to ambiguity
when faced with difficult state-federal balance questions
in the hope that courts will construe the enactment broadly.
State officials have had some success in achieving narrow constructions of cooperative federalism enactments by
using the "clear statement doctrine"."' For example, a dispute has arisen concerning the role the OSM is to play in
relation to the role played by the states in implementation of
the SMCRA. State officials have argued that the SMCRA
scheme gives the states primary authority to promulgate
and enforce a state regulatory program which implements
the minimum standards set forth within the body of the Act,
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 8upra note 28,
at 2363.
Id. at 2354.
See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Train, 544 F.2d 657 (3rd Cir. 1976);
United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1979) ; Sierra Club v. EPA,
540 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 959 (1977).
L. TRIBE, supra note 48, §5-8, at 243-44. See United States v. Emmans, 410
U.S. 396 (1973).
L. TRIBE, supra note 48, § 5-8, at 244.
.
See, e.g., EPA v Brown; 431 U.S. 99. (1975); Sierra Club v. EPA, 540
F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
-
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in Title V." This argument carried to its logical end would
mean that the Act merely creates minimum mining control
and reclamation standards, leaving actual implementation
of these standards to state authorities. In support of this
position, it has also been argued that Congress realized that
a stringent uniform national program was not feasible given
the great diversity of conditions under which coal is mined
in the different regions of the United States."' The variance of "state window" provisions in Title V permit a mining operator to use reclamation procedures other than those
prescribed in the Act if he can show that such reclamation
will allow the reclaimed mine site to be used in a manner
which is at least as productive as would be possible through
adherence to the standards prescribed by the Act." 8 State
officials have argued that these variance provisions evidence
the flexibility in implementation envisioned by Congress."'
OSM, on the other hand, has attempted to assume
primary responsibility over implementation of the SMCRA.
OSM promulgated over one hundred and fifty pages of
regulations with four hundred pages of explanatory comment.2' These regulations prescribe not only general administrative procedures, but also specific and precise procedures and techniques to be used in mining and reclamation.'' In addition, state officials have accused OSM of
effectively closing "state windows" by requiring onerous
showings in order to obtain approval of variances." ' State
officials have also alleged that OSM requires almost
verbatim copies of the federal regulations before it will
approve a state program.'
The question raised in this
dispute is whether the SMCRA gives primary authority
for implementation and regulation of the Title V Standards
to the states, or to the federal agency.
116. See Friedman & Siedzikowski, Federal and State Regulatory Authority
Under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 82 W. VA.
L. REV. 1053 (1980).
117. Id.
118. See 30 U.S.C. § 1265(d) (Supp. III 1979).
119. See generally Friedman & Siedzikowski, supra note 116.
120. See generally 30 C.F.R. §§ 700-950 (1981).
121. See Note, Surface Mining Control, supra note 73, at 764.
122. Id. at 766.
123. Id.
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Several state officials challenged the OSM regulations
in legal proceedings in the Distrcit of Columbia, alleging
the agency had exceeded its authority in prescribing standards which exceed those enumerated in Title V of the Act
itself. In In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation
Litigation,"4 a panel for the D.C. Circuit Court chose to
narrowly construe the provisions of the Act so as to minimize the imposition of the Act upon state sovereignty. The
panel construed the Act as giving states primary regulatory
and decision making authority," 5 while limiting the role
of OSM to one of overseeing state enforcement. The panel
reasoned that the construction of the SMCRA sought by
OSM would take away the discretion Congress sought to
vest in the states.' The panel held that Congress' intent
was to have the states implement the SMCRA, and not to
have the states ministerially enforce a federally devised
program."'
This is not to say that Congress could not limit the
role played by states in cooperative federalism programs.
The Court in Hodel stated that "Congress could constitutionally have enacted a statute prohibiting any state regulation of surface coal mining".128 But until Congress does
so by "clearly stating" its intent, states may argue that
they still retain important roles in regulating local activities under cooperative federalism enactments.
State officials may also seek to persuade Congress not
to preempt state regulations under the Commerce Clause.
10 ENwrL. L. REP. (ENVrL. L. INST.) 20, 526 (D.C. Cir. July 10, 1980).
Id. at 10.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 15. Upon the Secretary of Interior's petition, the D.C. Circuit Court
granted rehearing en bane and vacated the panel decision. In re Permanent
Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 653 F.2d 514 (D.C. 1981). The Circuit Court maintained that the states are given power to administer the
SMCRA, and the OSM is given power to oversee state programs. Id. at
519. But then the Circuit Court stated that section 201 (c) (2) of the Act,
30 U.S.C. 1211 (c) (2) (Supp. .11 1979), gave OSM general rule making
power, and that rules promulgated thereunder which define the broad
terms used in the Act would be valid. Id. at 524. The court did not necessarily contradict the "clear statement doctrine", but rather, after reviewing the Act, concluded that "[t]he legislative history makes absolutely
clear the expectation that the Secretary would define the [broad provisions
of the SMCRA] in his regulations. .. ." Id. at 527 (emphasis added).
128. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, supra note 28,
at 2367 (emphasis added).
124.
125.
126.
127.
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Some authors have stated that in modern times the most
effective limitations on congressional Commerce Clause
powers are political, since the Congress is comprised of
representatives from the several sovereign states." 9 In
response to OSM's "hard liner" approach to implementation of the Act, West Virginia's Governor, Jay Rockefeller,
lobbied in the United States Senate for an amendment to
the SMCRA which came to be known as the "Rockefeller
Amendment".3 ° The amendment would have greatly restricted OSM's authority under the Act. The bill passed
the Senate by a lopsided vote in 1979, but then stalled in
Congressman Udall's Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs.13 '
IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION IN HODEL

If the primary protections of state sovereignty which
remain are political, states may have to resort to lobbying
efforts to protect their sovereignty. Since such sovereignty
would be retained at the sufferance of Congress, it is
questionable whether it should really be called sovereignty
at all. On the other hand, without uniform national standards, economic disincentives may deter states form enacting more stringent environmental protection laws."' If
a state enacted reclamation standards which were stricter
than those in neighboring states, all other things being
equal, its local mine operators would be placed at a disadvantage in the marketplace. 3 Thus uniform national
standards are necessary to accomplish reform in environmental protection laws. Therefore the choice may be between preservation of traditional state sovereignty notions,
or preservation of the environment.
The most practical approach is to strike a balance
between these two extremes. It is possible that Congress
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 48, § 5-7, at 241.
S. 1403, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
Edgman & Menzel, eupra note 109, at 262-63.
30 U.S.C. § 1202(g) (Supp. III 1979).
In other words, if a state enacted minimum standards higher than its
neighbors, its local enterprises would be at a disadvantage in the marketplace because of higher prices. Businesses would tend to migrate to states
where more lenient standards existed. Thus the state would be deterred
from any effort to improve existing conditions.
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attempted to strike this balance through the SMCRA by
creating national standards while leaving actual implementation to local officials who can adjust the standards
to varying local conditions. Under this scheme states still
play a vital role in implementing the broader national
policy set forth by the Congress, while the desired national
uniformity is achieved. Indeed, without such flexibility it
would be impossible to effectively implement the national
standards without unduly inhibiting equally important
attempts at energy development.
The plight of coal mine operators in Appalachia which
was described in Hodel serves to illustrate the inefficiency
of strict enforcement of national standards for coal mining.
Virginia, in Hodel, cited studies conducted in Appalachia
which concluded that strict enforcement of "original contour" provisions in that region could cause the very hazards
and pollution the SMCRA was created to prevent." 4 They
also argued that reclaimed minesites were more productive
if left level rather than returned to their original contour
since there was a shortage of level land in the area.'35 They
offered to show that such leveled lands had been used for
farming, and that important facilities had been built on
leveled lands, such as airports, hospitals, and schools." '
These arguments point to the fact that cooperative federalism programs regulating an industry as diversified as
surface coal mining will fail unless they are, in fact,
cooperative. One of the express purposes of the SMCRA is
to strike a balance between conflicting, and perhaps competing, national interests in environmental protection and
in energy development."8 7 If OSM is to effectively play a role
in the effectuation of this compromise, it must start by
recognizing the need for flexibility in enforcement of the
Act, and must allow "state window" variance provisions
to be used where variance from the Title V standards will
reach a better result.
134. Brief of Petitioners, supra note 21, at 26-30.
135. Id. at 5-7.
136. Id.; see also findings of fact in Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation
Ass'n, Inc. v. Andrus, supra note 25, at 435.
137. 80 U.S.C. § 1202(f) (Supp. III 1979).
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CONCLUSION

In Hodel, the SMCRA survived Commerce Clause and
Tenth Amendment challenges. The Court reasoned that the
potential adverse environmental impact of surface mining
could substantially affect interstate commerce, and could
therefore be regulated by Congress. Since the provisions of
the Act only regulate the actions of private individuals and
businesses, the Act did not violate the Tenth Amendment.
The effect of the Hodel decision is to validate "cooperative
federalism" programs in the context of federal environmental protection enactments. The opinion in Hodel also
clarifies the parameters of Usery by affirming a narrow
scope of intergovernmental immunities from regulation.
The opinion implies a three step analysis to be used in
Tenth Amendment cases which gives rise to a presumption
of invalidity. If the three factors are shown to exist, the
presumption of invalidity can only be overcome by compelling
federal interests.
Since cooperative federalism enactments are valid, state
and federal officials must seek to work out their differences. The conflicting interests of energy development and
environmental protection can best be attanied through a
spirit of cooperation and through flexibility in enforcement
of national standards. Without this sort of flexibility,
environmental protection can best be attained through a
unduly inhibiting national efforts at energy development.
This seems to be the practical approach taken by Congress,
and Congress' intent must be implemented through the OSM.
THOMAS R. LAMONS
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